Constitutional References and Architects’ Disciplinary Proceedings: Recent Guidance from the Constitutional Court
Constitutional references often provide some of the clearest guidance on the interpretation of constitutional and Convention law. The recent judgments delivered by the First Hall of the Civil Court in its Constitutional Jurisdiction (the “First Court”) and, on appeal, by the Constitutional Court on the 13th July 2026, in the parallel proceedings instituted by architects Anthony Mangion and Roderick Camilleri against the Chamber of Architects, provide a notable example. The judgments addressed a number of important questions concerning the nature and fairness of architects’ disciplinary proceedings and ultimately upheld the Chamber’s position that the disciplinary decisions should not be annulled.
A. The Questions Referred to the Constitutional Court
The referring court submitted the following questions to the First Court:
- Whether the disciplinary proceedings before the Chamber of Architects’ Committee were criminal or civil in nature;
- Whether the Committee’s power to investigate and sanction an architect gave rise to a breach of the principle of impartiality;
- Whether the provision entitling an architect to exculpate himself infringed the presumption of innocence; and
- Whether any resulting constitutional or Convention-related deficiencies warranted the annulment of the disciplinary decisions;
B. Are Architects’ Disciplinary Proceedings Civil or Criminal in Nature?
The architects argued that the disciplinary proceedings were criminal in nature and thus raised a possible breach of the presumption of innocence. They argued that requiring an architect to “exculpate” himself necessarily implies a presumption of guilt. Both the State Advocate and the Chamber of Architects disagreed. Whilst the Chamber of Architects proposed the possibility of the proceedings being classified as having an administrative disciplinary nature as a category in its own right, the Court considered the classification of disciplinary proceedings as having a civil nature to be well established, and limited its analysis to whether the proceedings were civil or criminal.
Applying the Engel[1] criteria, it observed that the legislation applied specifically to architects, was not framed as criminal legislation and did not pursue a punitive aim, but was intended to protect the integrity of the profession. The Court also considered the seriousness of the possible sanctions, in that the most severe consequence, being the loss of the warrant to practise, was considered a typical disciplinary sanction which may be considered a reasonable and logical consequence of one’s failure to meet the required professional standards.
The First Court therefore concluded that architects’ disciplinary proceedings are inherently civil. It consequently did not consider the third question on the presumption of innocence, since that safeguard applies only to proceedings involving a criminal charge.
C. Impartiality and the Trial as a Whole Approach
Regulations 5 and 6 of Subsidiary Legislation 390.01 provide for a system whereby the Chamber of Architects’ Committee handles the whole disciplinary process, from the investigation stage up to the decision. The architects argued that combining these roles breached the principles of impartiality and a fair hearing.
In answering the second question, the First Court held that the procedure did breach the principle of impartiality because the same individuals acted as investigators, prosecutors and adjudicators. However, when considering the fourth question, the Court answered that the breach did not justify annulling the disciplinary decisions. It relied on the principle that deficiencies before a disciplinary board or tribunal may be remedied where its decision is subject to appeal before a court having full jurisdiction to determine the matter.
Even though the First Court did not address these arguments specifically, this position is closely connected to the “trial as a whole” approach, relied on by the Chamber of Architects and the State Advocate. Under this principle, the fairness of proceedings is assessed by considering the entire process. This is particularly relevant in disciplinary proceedings, where an appellate court with sufficiently broad powers may remedy deficiencies arising at an earlier stage by addressing any concerns raised by the appellant in such a way as to remedy any deficiencies at a lower instance.
The Court also rejected the argument that the Court of Appeal lacked full jurisdiction because the Warranting Board retained the final power to suspend or revoke a warrant. Although the legislation assigns that power to the Board, it must be read within the wider framework, which also empowers the criminal courts, the Committee and the Court of Appeal to determine matters affecting a warrant. In such cases, the Board’s role is to give effect to the decision already taken by the competent forum.
D. The Role of the Court Determining a Constitutional Reference
On appeal, the appellant architects challenged the First Court’s decision by arguing that the Court should not have limited itself to merely answering the submitted questions, but that it should also have given specific directions on how constitutional deficiencies were to be addressed and remedied by the referring court.
The respondent Chamber of Architects, aligning itself with the submissions of the State Advocate, argued that the First Court had held that any shortcomings at the disciplinary stage were capable of being remedied since the Court of Appeal had the full competence to decide all the architects’ contestations fully. Accordingly, further directions on how specific deficiencies should be rectified would fall outside the scope of the constitutional reference and would be inconsistent with the First Court’s decision.
The Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal and clarified the distinct roles of the referring court and the court determining the constitutional reference. It emphasised that a reference is made by the referring court and is defined by the questions contained in the order of reference. An appeal from the resulting judgment cannot be used to introduce further questions or obtain directions on matters that were not referred. Since no question had been submitted concerning the procedure to be followed during the appeal on the merits, the First Court was not required to prescribe how the Court of Appeal should proceed. That remained a matter for the Court of Appeal, which was fully aware of its statutory powers, including its power to give any necessary procedural directions and to hear evidence where appropriate.
E. Conclusion
The judgments provide important guidance on both the constitutional standards governing professional disciplinary proceedings and the proper function of the constitutional reference procedure. Although the Committee’s combined investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative role was found to give rise to a deficiency in impartiality, that deficiency was not considered sufficiently serious to invalidate the disciplinary proceedings because each architect enjoyed a full right of appeal before the Court of Appeal.
The Constitutional Court further confirmed that the court determining a constitutional reference must answer the questions referred to it, but is not required to prescribe how the referring court should subsequently conduct or determine the underlying proceedings unless that issue forms part of the order of reference. An appeal from the judgment on the reference cannot be used to expand the questions originally submitted.
The appeals on the merits will now resume before the Court of Appeal, which will determine how those principles are to be applied in the disciplinary appeals themselves.
Dr Joseph Mizzi and Adv. Ylenia Busuttil represented the Chamber of Architects (Kamra tal-Periti), whose position was upheld in the constitutional appeals discussed in this article.
[1] Engel and Others v the Netherlands, Apps nos 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72 and 5370/72 (ECtHR, 8 June 1976)
