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Zero-Commission Trading: Is Payment for Order Flow consistent with local rules transposing MiFID II?

Zero-Commission Trading: Is Payment for Order Flow consistent with local rules transposing MiFID II?

The rise of zero-commission trading has brought about a revolution in the investment services industry; contributing in part to the unprecedented number of retail investors that are now actively participating in financial markets. On the one side, zero-commission trading has been described as a step forward in the democratisation of investing, and an opportunity for many to manage their wealth in an economic environment characterised by low interest rates and inflation risks. Others have likened this activity to “gambling”, raising alarm bells and cautioning that this might have serious repercussions to the wider economy in the future. There is no doubt that technological advances have played a key role in this revolution. Whereas in the past, willing investors visited or called their local broker to order investments, nowadays, mobile applications provide market access in just a few simple steps without any meaningful interaction with the broker. However, active trading would not make sense for retail investors if a commission were to be paid to the broker in respect of each trade. The solution to this problem was the creation of a revenue stream that enabled brokers to do away with commission when receiving, transmitting or executing orders. This revenue steam is referred to as “payment for order flow” or “PFOF”. In a recent public statement issued by the European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”), PFOF was described as “the practice of brokers receiving payments from third parties for directing client order flow to them as execution venues.” The practice of PFOF appears to be inconsistently enforced within the European Union.  As a general rule, in accordance with the Conduct of Business Rules transposing MiFID II issued by the Malta Financial Services Authority (“MFSA”) (“Conduct of Business Rules”), investment firms are obliged to avoid conflicts of interest in so far as it is possible to do so. Such rules further provide that a conflict of interest is deemed to arise where a fee or commission is accepted by an investment firm in connection with the provision of a service by any party except the client, unless it can be shown that such fees or commissions: (i) are designed to enhance the quality of the relevant service to the client; and (ii) do no impinge on the firm’s duty to act in the best interests of the client. On that basis, it can be reasonably deduced that PFOF creates a conflict of interest between the investment firm and the client. This was also confirmed in the public statement issued by ESMA on the subject of PFOF, where it held that: “The receipt of PFOF from third parties by a firm executing client orders causes a clear conflict of interest between the firm and its clients because it incentivises the firm to choose the third party offering the highest payment, rather than the best possible outcome for its clients.” ESMA further emphasised that “the consideration and eventual choice for a particular third party for the execution of client orders should be solely driven by the aim of obtaining the best possible result for clients and should in no way be influenced by the amount of PFOF the third party is willing to provide.” The Conduct of Business Rules on inducements provide identical qualifications to those set out above in relation to conflicts of interest, and additionally require investment firms to disclose the existence and the maximum fees (or range thereof) received through PFOF to their clients. In this regard, ESMA stated that firms receiving PFOF “must comply with the quality enhancement and best interests requirements…Specifically, PFOF will not be acceptable if it results in distorting or biasing the provision of the relevant service to the client.”   Finally, the Conduct of Business Rules also require investment firms to obtain the best possible result for their clients when executing their orders and this after taking into account factors such as “price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or any other consideration relevant to the execution of the order.” This was also reiterated in ESMA’s public statement where it clarified that “when establishing their execution arrangements firms should consider both third parties willing to provided PFOF and those unwilling to provide PFOF, and the factors used to choose one third party over another should strictly relate to obtaining the best possible result for the client…The possible execution venues and factors used for their selection shall be clearly identified in the firm’s execution policy, and the effectiveness of the firm’s order execution arrangements shall be monitored on a regular basis.”  Based on the above, it appears that while neither the Conduct of Business Rules nor ESMA’s public statement on the subject do not expressly forbid PFOF business models, the adoption of such revenue streams need to demonstrably adhere to the existing rules related to conflicts of interest, inducements and best execution. In addition to the above, ESMA also warned “zero-commission brokers” to refrain from marketing themselves as “cost-free” as it could breach an investment firm’s duty to provide fair, clear and not misleading information to their clients and, furthermore, “could incentivise retail investors’ gaming or speculative behaviour due to the incorrect perception that trading is free.” ESMA further concluded that “in most cases it is unlikely that PFOF could be compatible with MiFID II and its delegated acts.” Based on the above, investment firms adopting PFOF business models should be mindful of the potential risks to their business which may be brought about by a change in regulation that could prohibit such models altogether. Such risks were noted in the widely anticipated S1 filing of Robinhood Markets Inc with the Securities and Exchange Commission; where the issuer noted as a material risk to the company’s profitability the eventuality of a change in laws prohibiting PFOF business models. On the other hand, retail investors should be mindful of PFOF and its potential implications to their financial wellbeing. Above all, they should ensure that they are aware of all costs and charges associated with the service they receive.
2021: Online Trading Platforms and Risks to Investor Protection

2021: Online Trading Platforms and Risks to Investor Protection

Among several events that 2021 will be remembered for, this year will probably go down as the year in which financial markets saw unprecedented levels of trading volumes, ostensibly due to the increased participation of retail investors making use of a variety of online trading platforms offering investments with low or no transaction costs and, in some cases, with the possibility of fractional trading.  Although it remains to be seen whether this activity will constitute a new normal, there is no doubt that the surge in trading volumes presents new risks related to investor protection, especially in the provision of “non-advised” investment services. What Protection Do Maltese Investors Enjoy?  Currently, under Maltese law, online trading platforms offering their services in or from within Malta must first obtain the applicable investment services licence from the Malta Financial Services Authority (“MFSA”) and their activities will then be subject to the supervision of the MSFA once the licence has been issued.   When signing up to a Maltese or EU passported trading platform, investors should have peace of mind that their assets will be segregated from the assets of the  service provider - therefore protecting them from insolvency risks associated with their choice of service provider.  Another cornerstone of investment protection in Europe is the requirement to properly categorise an investor depending on their means, as well as their understanding of financial markets - this in order to assess the suitability of an investment and the appropriateness of the investor prior to offering an investment or making  any recommendation.  However, since the majority of online trading platforms are being used to procure “non-advised” services, investors should be aware that they will lose certain protections that would otherwise be available to them.  In this regard, under the Rules published by the MFSA transposing the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (“MiFID II”), online trading platforms offering execution or reception and transmission of orders may provide those services without any requirement to assess the knowledge and experience of the client (the “Appropriateness Test”), when the service relates to “non-complex” financial instruments and when it is provided “at the initiative of the client”.  In this regard, the main obligation of the online trading platform is merely to inform the client that it is not required to conduct an Appropriateness Test and that consequently the corresponding investor protections will be lost.   Where a financial instrument is deemed to be “complex”, local rules require the service provider to carry out the Appropriateness Test, pursuant to which, it must assess whether the services should be provided to the investor on an “advised” or “non-advised basis”. The extent to which online trading platforms are observing these rules remains unclear, although it has been noted that a number of licence holders around the EU are being cautioned or fined by regulators in respect of shortcomings arising in this regard.   In an apparent act of recognition of the risks to investor protection posed by online trading platforms, on 29 January 2021, the European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) published a consultation paper on draft guidelines  regarding certain aspects of the MiFID II appropriateness and execution-only requirements. It appears that ESMA is primarily concerned with the lack of uniform application of several areas of the appropriateness and execution-only requirements by investment firms across different Member States.  Some key aspects of the guidelines include: - the duty to inform investors on the utility of the Appropriateness Test and to make proper determinations when this is required;- the effectiveness of the warnings to investors; - the extent of information which must  be obtained from investors and its reliability;- staff qualifications; and- record-keeping.  ESMA has invited interested stakeholders to provide their feedback on the proposed guidelines by 29 April 2021. The easy access to financial markets through online trading platforms is seen as a step forward in the democratisation of investing and it is anticipated that any steps taken by regulators to curtail this participation will be met with resistance. However, it remains an accepted fact that short-term trading is an extremely complex endeavour and retail investors speculating in financial instruments should be mindful that they are ultimately competing against sophisticated institutional investors that have the advantage of having robust research budgets and quicker access to market data through costly technologies. Retail investors should therefore be cautious when investing on online trading platforms and should heed to the various warnings received in the course of trading.  At the same time, investment services providers should seize the opportunity behind the increased participation of retail investors to educate investors, promote diversification and long-term investing and to attempt to bridge the gap created by information asymmetry in financial markets.     

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